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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PARTS.COM, LLC,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 13-CV-1074 JLS (WMc)
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
(ECF No. 9)
vs.
GOOGLE INC.,
Defendant.
Presently before the Court is Defendant Google Inc.’s (“Defendant,” or
“Google”) Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) Plaintiff Parts.com, LLC’s (“Plaintiff,” or
“Parts.com”) Complaint.  (ECF No. 9.)  Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s Response
in Opposition to (ECF No. 11) and Defendant’s Reply in Support of (ECF No. 12) the
Motion.  The hearing set for the Motion on September 26, 2013 was vacated, and the
matter taken under submission on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil
Local Rule 7.1.d.1.  (ECF No. 13.)  Having considered the parties’ arguments and the
law, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s MTD and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an online retailer of automotive parts that has been in operation since
January 2002.  (Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.)  Parts.com lists and sells automotive parts
using the trademark “Parts.com.”  (Id.)  The Parts.com mark was registered on
September 16, 2008, to Intelligentz Corporation, which subsequently assigned the mark
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to Parts.com on February 24, 2012.  (Id. ¶ 7.)  Parts.com describes itself as the “source
of over 20 million automotive replacement parts, accessories, catalogues and related
automotive materials and equipment for over 40 automobile manufacturers worldwide.” 
(Id.)
Defendant is an Internet search engine provider.  (Id. ¶ 9.)  As part of its business,
Defendant sells “keyword triggers”—search terms that trigger the display of sponsored
links—to businesses wishing to advertise on Defendant’s search engine.  (Id. ¶ 11.) 
Defendant displays these sponsored links alongside “organic results”—links that are a
result of Defendant’s search engine algorithm rather than the payment of an advertising
premium.  (Id. ¶ 11.)  
The search query “parts.com” on Defendant’s search engine yields a lengthy list
of results, many of which are unrelated to Plaintiff’s website.  (Id., Ex. B.)  In the
section of the search results page labeled “Ads,” two links are displayed with the
heading “Parts.com,” neither of which direct to Plaintiff’s website.  (Id., Ex. B.)  
Plaintiff discovered Defendant’s alleged use of its mark in or around 2007.  (Id.
¶ 27.)  On November 20, 2007, Plaintiff sent Defendant a cease-and-desist letter.  (Id.) 
Defendant did not respond.  (Id.)  Plaintiff sent Defendant a subsequent e-mail on
December 28, 2007.  (Id. ¶ 28.)  On January 2, 2008, Defendant responded, suggesting
that Plaintiff register its mark.  (Id.)  Defendant purportedly “never ceased unauthorized
use of the parts.com sponsored links.”  (Id. ¶ 27.)  Plaintiff claims to have lost “at least
$2 million per year” because of Defendant’s alleged infringement.  (Id. ¶ 34.) 
As a result, Plaintiff asserts the following six claims against Defendant: (1)
federal trademark infringement, (2) federal false designation of origin and unfair
competition, (3) state trademark infringement and unfair competition, (4) state unfair
and deceptive trade practices, (5) federal trademark dilution, and (6) state trademark
dilution and injury to business reputation.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the
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defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”
generally referred to as a motion to dismiss.  The Court evaluates whether a complaint
states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).  In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).  “Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  A claim is
facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).  That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id.  Facts
“‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to
relief.  Id.  (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).  Further, the Court need not accept as
true “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint.  Id.  This review requires context-
specific analysis involving the Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
679 (citation omitted).  “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”  Id.
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless
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the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’”  DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).  In other words, where leave to
amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. 
DISCUSSION
Defendant presents two arguments in support of its MTD.  First, Defendant
contends that all six of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by laches.  Second, Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by the Communications Decency
Act.  The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
I. Laches as an Affirmative Defense to Trademark Causes of Action
“Laches is an equitable time limitation on a party’s right to bring suit.”  Jarrow
Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Boone
v. Mech. Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  A defendant seeking to assert the defense of laches must prove that (1) the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing suit, and (2) the defendant was prejudiced as a
result.  Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001).  Although laches
is an equitable defense, it is “well established that laches is a valid defense to Lanham
Act claims for both monetary damages and injunctive relief.”  Miller v. Glenn Miller
Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).   Laches can bar not
only federal Lanham Act claims, but state law trademark and unfair competition claims
as well.  See, e.g., Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 842–43.
A. Asserting Laches at the Dismissal Stage
Plaintiff asserts that a laches defense is improper at the dismissal stage.  (Resp.
in Opp’n 8–9, ECF No. 11.)  Although it is true that some courts will not grant
dismissal or summary judgment on the basis of laches—see e.g., Country Floors, Inc.
v. P’ship Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1991) (summary
judgment stage); Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
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(dismissal stage)—the Ninth Circuit’s position is not as clear.  Although Jarrow
certainly stands for the proposition that a grant of summary judgment on the basis of
laches can be proper, it is less clear whether laches is also appropriate at the dismissal
stage.  304 F.3d at 843.
Some courts within this Circuit have at least entertained, if not granted,
dismissals premised on laches.  See, e.g., Thermolife Int’l, LLC v. Gaspari Nutrition,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909–11 (D. Ariz. 2012) (considering but denying dismissal
on basis of laches due to lack of unreasonable delay); Aristocrat Techs., Inc. v. High
Impact Design & Entm’t, No. 2:07-CV-01033-BES-LRL, 2009 WL 1911464, at *3–4
(D. Nev. June 23, 2009) (considering but denying dismissal on basis of laches due to
lack of prejudice from delay).  At the same time, many opinions advise against applying
laches at the dismissal stage.  See, e.g., Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078,
1083 (9th Cir. 2000); Italia Marittima, S.P.A. v. Seaside Transp. Servs., LLC, No. C 10-
0803 PJH, 2010 WL 3504834, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2010).  Accordingly, while this
Court does not conclude that laches is improper per se on a motion to dismiss, the Court
is mindful that laches generally “is ill-suited for a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.”  Italia Marittima, 2010 WL 3504834, at *6.  
B. The Presumption of Laches
Defendant argues that laches bars Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety.  (MTD 24,
ECF No. 9-1.)  “[I]f suit is filed outside of the analogous [statute of] limitations period,
courts often have presumed that laches is applicable.”  Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 836
(citations omitted).  Because the Lanham Act does not legislate a limitations period, the
Ninth Circuit presumes that laches bars a claim when the plaintiff files the suit outside
of the “analogous state limitations period.”  Id. at 836–37 (citations omitted).  This
limitations period starts running  as soon as the plaintiff “knew or should have known
about its potential cause of action.”  Id. at 838.  Regardless of whether this presumption
applies, courts still analyze the facts to determine whether there was an unreasonable
delay and whether the defendant was prejudiced.  See id. at 838–40.   
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The limitations period both for Plaintiff’s California trademark infringement
claim and trademark dilution claim is four years.  Miller, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 942 & n.11
(citing Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. §§ 337, 343).  That same limitations period applies to
Plaintiff’s federal trademark infringement and dilution claims.  See id.   The statute of
limitations for Plaintiff’s California unfair and deceptive trade practices claim is also
four years.  See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208.  Lastly, the court in Jarrow found that
California’s three-year limitations period for fraud applied to a federal false advertising
claim brought pursuant to § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act.  See Jarrow, 304 F.3d at
838 (citations omitted); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d).  A federal false advertising claim
is sufficiently analogous to a § 43(a)(1)(A) federal false designation of origin claim to
justify applying the same three-year limitations period here.  Accordingly, all of
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to either a three- or four-year statute of limitations.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s limitations period began running in November
2007, when Defendant received Plaintiff’s cease-and-desist letter.  (Compl. ¶ 27, ECF
No. 1; MTD 11, ECF No. 9-1.)  Plaintiff impliedly counters that the limitations period
stopped running when Defendant “stopped infringing shortly after January 2, 2008,”
only to resume infringement “after some waiting period.”  (Resp. in Opp’n 9, ECF No.
11.)  As Defendant points out, however, Plaintiff fails to allege this “stop and restart”
infringement strategy in the Complaint, and thus it is not properly raised here.  See
Jappa v. California, No. 08cv1813 WQH (PQR), 2009 WL 69312, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
8, 2009) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Reply 6–7, ECF No. 12.  Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint
actually alleges the opposite of a “stop and restart” theory, as Plaintiff states that it
knew of Defendant’s use of the Parts.com mark on November 20, 2007, and that
Defendant “never ceased unauthorized use of the parts.com sponsored links.”  (Compl.
¶ 27, ECF No. 1 (emphasis added).)  Accordingly, based on the facts alleged in the
Complaint, the Court concludes that the limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims began
running on November 20, 2007.  Plaintiff filed its Complaint on May 6, 2013.  This
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filing date marks more than five and one-half years after the date on which the
limitations period began to run.  Because all of the limitations periods for Plaintiff’s
various claims are at most four years, Plaintiff’s delay activates the laches presumption. 
See Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 838.
Plaintiff, however, contends that Defendant’s infringement is willful, rendering
laches inapplicable.  (Resp. in Opp’n 9–10, ECF No. 11.)  Plaintiff argues that
Defendant’s infringement is willful because Defendant received notice that it was using
Plaintiff’s mark, briefly stopped its infringement, and then resumed using the Parts.com
mark.  (Id.)  As already explained, however, this “stop and restart” theory is not alleged
in the Complaint and accordingly cannot support a finding of willful infringement.  But,
even if this argument were properly before this Court, the mere fact that Defendant
received a cease-and-desist letter and failed to stop its alleged infringement is not
sufficient proof of willfulness.  If this were the state of the law, even those who
continued to use a mark in good faith after receiving a cease-and-desist letter would be
precluded from asserting laches.  Then defendants might be forced to halt certain
business activities during litigation of infringement issues, potentially at great cost, even
if the claims were without much merit.  Such a position is untenable.  Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s willful infringement argument does not preclude Defendant’s
laches defense.
C. The Jarrow Two-Prong Test
Having determined that the presumption of laches applies, the Court now turns
to whether (1) Plaintiff unreasonably delayed filing suit, and (2) Defendant suffered
prejudice as a result.  Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 951.  These two elements operate on a sliding
scale: if the delay is short, the amount of prejudice required is great, but if the delay is
long, “prejudice is more likely to have occurred and less proof of prejudice will be
required.”  Miller, 454 F.3d at 1000 (citation omitted).
i. Unreasonable Delay
In evaluating the reasonableness of a markholder’s delay in bringing suit, courts
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examine the length of the delay beyond the limitations period and whether “plaintiff has
proffered a legitimate excuse for its delay.”  See Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 838 (citing
Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954–55.  Because the Court has found that the limitations periods
applicable to Plaintiff’s claims are at most four years, and because the Court has found
that these statutes of limitations began running approximately five and one-half years
ago, each of Plaintiff’s claims is at least a year and one-half beyond its applicable
limitations period.  Plaintiff proffers its “stop and restart” theory as an excuse for this
significant delay.  (Resp. in Opp’n 9, ECF No. 11.)  Again, however, this excuse is
inapplicable because it is not alleged in the Complaint.  In fact, because the Complaint
alleges that Defendant “never ceased unauthorized use of the parts.com sponsored
links,” Plaintiff had a more than sufficient opportunity to file its claims within the
limitations period.  (Compl. ¶ 27, ECF No. 1.)  Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
delay to be unreasonable.  See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391
F.3d 1088, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding a four-year delay in filing suit
unreasonable).
ii. Prejudice
The Ninth Circuit primarily recognizes two types of prejudice in the laches
analysis: evidentiary and expectations-based.  Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955.  Either kind of
prejudice is sufficient to satisfy this requirement.  Id.  Despite the laches presumption,
Defendant retains the burden of proving prejudice.  See, e.g., Internet Specialties W.,
Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgio Enters., Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).  
a. Evidentiary Prejudice
Evidentiary prejudice encompasses concerns over “lost, stale, or degraded
evidence, or witnesses whose memories have faded or who have died.”  Danjaq, 263
F.3d at 955 (citations omitted).  Defendant argues that it will suffer evidentiary
prejudice because (1) Plaintiff has already failed to produce a copy of the original,
signed cease-and-desist letter; and (2) the dynamic nature of Defendant’s sponsored-
link displays means that a significant amount of information may no longer be
- 8 - 13cv1074
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available.  (MTD21–22, ECF No. 9-1.)  Defendant also argues that, if the lawsuit were
to proceed beyond this motion, the prohibitive difficulty of conducting consumer
surveys regarding brand recognition at the time of the initial alleged infringement in
2007 would be prejudicial.  (Id. at 22.)  
If this were a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss, the
Court would find this argument compelling; however, this argument seems premature. 
It may be that either party would be able to produce a copy of the original, signed cease-
and-desist letter if discovery proceeds.  Similarly, it is hard to believe that
Defendant—a top-tier Internet business whose very name has become synonymous with
Internet searching—would not have detailed records about whether certain keywords
were active or inactive during the relevant period of time.
The Court finds  ATM Express, Inc. v. ATM Express, Inc., cited by Defendant in
support of its argument, distinguishable.  No. 07cv1293-L(RBB), 2009 WL 2973034
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2009).  ATM Express involved a motion for summary judgment,
and thus there was a more developed evidentiary record.  Moreover, ATM Express
involved a delay approximately twice as long as the delay at issue here.  See id. at *1,
9.  Thus, a strong basis for concern over “lost, stale, or degraded evidence, or witnesses
whose memories have faded or who have died” existed in ATM Express.  Danjaq, 263
F.3d at 955 (citations omitted).  It is hard to convince a court that one is prejudiced in
this way, however, when the parties have hardly begun searching for evidence in the
first place.  Accordingly, at this time, the Court finds that Defendant has not
satisfactorily proven evidentiary prejudice.
b. Expectations-Based Prejudice
Expectations-based prejudice exists if the defendant “took actions or suffered
consequences that it would not have, had the plaintiff brought suit promptly.”  Danjaq,
263 F.3d at 955  (citations omitted).  “A defendant may establish [such expectations-
based] prejudice by showing that during the delay, it invested money to expand its
business or entered into business transactions based on [its] presumed rights.”  Miller,
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454 F.3d at 999–1000 (citations omitted).  Or, a defendant can establish this form of
prejudice by showing that it may incur liability for damages as a result of entering into
such business transactions during the delay.  Id. at 1000.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request for $2 million in damages per year of
infringement, trebled for willfulness—a potential liability of approximately $36
million—establishes expectations-based prejudice, because Plaintiff’s delay led
Defendant to enter into allegedly infringing business transactions it would not have
entered into had Plaintiff sued earlier, and because Defendant’s potential liability
increased the longer Plaintiff waited to bring suit.  (MTD 23–24, ECF No. 9-1.)  The
Court finds Defendant’s argument persuasive.  
Mere expenditures during a filing delay are insufficient to establish expectations-
based prejudice.  See, e.g., Internet Specialties W., 559 F.3d at 991–92; Miller, 454 F.3d
at 1000.  Increased potential liability resulting from a continuation of existing practices
during that period, however, is sufficient.  See RSP Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
No. 5:08-cv-3414 RMW, 2012 WL 3277136, at * 15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (citing
Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 736 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984);
ExperExchange, Inc. v. Doculex, Inc., No. 08-03875 JCS, 2009 WL 3837275 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 2009)).  
It is uncontested—and, indeed, the Complaint explicitly alleges—that Defendant
continued to provide sponsored links that displayed, and were generated in response to,
the Parts.com mark during Plaintiff’s filing delay.  (Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 1.)  Had
Plaintiff brought suit earlier, Defendant would not be vulnerable to an additional annual
liability of $6 million.  If the damages Plaintiff sought were a lump sum, the calculus
likely would be different.  But such is not the case.  Because Plaintiff seeks a figure that
increases over time, it would be inequitable to reward Plaintiff for dragging its heels. 
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay has increased Defendant’s potential
liability, the Court finds that Defendant has experienced expectations-based prejudice
as a result.
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D. The E-Systems Factors
In addition to Jarrow’s two-prong test, the Ninth Circuit has articulated six
factors to be weighed in deciding whether to apply laches: (1) the strength and value of
the trademark rights asserted; (2) the senior user’s diligence in enforcing its mark; (3)
the extent of any harm to the senior user if relief is denied; (4) any good faith ignorance
on the part of the junior user; (5) whether the senior and junior users are competitors;
and (6) the extent of any harm suffered by the junior user because of the senior user’s
delay.  E-Systems, Inc. v. Monitek, Inc., 720 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Ninth Circuit has not fully explained how the older E-Systems factors fit with
Jarrow’s framework, although some courts have folded the two inquiries together.  See,
e.g., Saul Zaentz Co. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal.
2008); RSI Corp., 2012 WL 3277136, at *16.  Because laches is an equitable defense,
the Court believes this thorough approach, attempting to weigh the equities, is
worthwhile.  This Court has already discussed the second factor (Plaintiff’s diligence)
and the sixth factor (the extent of the harm suffered by Defendant).  See id. at 1114. 
Accordingly, the four remaining E-Systems factors are discussed below.
i. First Factor: Strength and Value of the Trademark Rights Asserted
Although both parties have spilled much ink debating whether Plaintiff’s
registered trademark is valid at all, the questions of strength and value are independent
from that inquiry.  See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638
F.3d 1137, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing “strength of mark” as factor in
likelihood of confusion analysis without contesting validity of mark).  The stronger the
mark, the more this factor will favor the senior user.  See id. at 1149 (“On balance, these
considerations favor [defendant].  The [mark] is unquestionably valuable and strong,
given [defendant’s] rapid and continuing growth.”); E-Systems, 720 F.2d at 607.  Value
is measured relative to the alleged infringer rather than the markholder.  Id.
Although Plaintiff’s mark may have acquired secondary meaning sufficient for
registration, it is at most a descriptive mark, because Parts.com describes a website
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where customers buy (car) parts.  See Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d
1135, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998)) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (“Descriptive marks define qualities or characteristics of a product in a
straightforward way that requires no exercise of the imagination to be understood.”). 
A descriptive mark “is inherently a weak mark.”  Id. at 1144 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).  Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any allegations
concerning the value of the Parts.com mark to Defendant.  The Court assumes,
however, that the mark’s value to a multi-billion dollar company like Google is slight,
as the income from any relevant keyword trigger sales is likely negligible. 
Accordingly, because the mark is weak and likely of low value, this factor favors
Defendant.
ii. Third Factor: Harm to Parts.com if Relief is Denied
Plaintiff claims that it “can demonstrate it has lost revenues from online sales of
parts and accessories of at least $2 million per year.”  (Compl. ¶ 34, ECF No. 1.) 
Although no exhibits support this figure, a court must assume, on a motion to dismiss,
the truth of all plausible facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  Because Parts.com’s business centers around the mark
in question, the Court finds no reason to doubt this figure.  Thus, this factor favors
Plaintiff.
iii. Fourth Factor: Google’s Good-Faith Ignorance
Although Defendant contests whether its use of the Parts.com mark is infringing,
the Complaint lacks allegations concerning what Defendant knew about the mark and
its ownership status prior to receiving Plaintiff’s cease-and-desist letter.  There is no
evidence concerning how long Defendant used the Parts.com mark prior to hearing
from Plaintiff in 2007, or whether Defendant knew about Parts.com when it began
selling related keyword triggers.  See, e.g., Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1104.  And,
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while Defendant allegedly continued using the mark after receiving Plaintiff’s cease-
and-desist letters, the Court has already found that this alone does not evidence bad
faith.  In light of the paucity of evidence as to this factor, the Court finds it to be neutral.
iv. Fifth Factor: Competition Between Parts.com and Google
Defendant is an online search engine and provider of other-Internet related
functionalities and services.  Plaintiff, on the other hand, is an online retailer of
automotive parts.  While both parties primarily conduct their business in cyberspace,
their deliverables overlap so tangentially that it cannot be said that the parties are
competitors in any meaningful sense.  Accordingly, this factor favors Defendant.  
E. Balancing of All Laches Considerations
In sum, the Court has found that there is a presumption of laches, given that
Plaintiff filed suit after all applicable statutes of limitations had run.  The Court has also
found that the Jarrow test favors applying laches, as Plaintiff unreasonably delayed in
asserting its rights and that delay resulted in expectations-based prejudice to Defendant. 
Lastly, as to the E-Systems factors, the Court has found that the Parts.com mark is
neither strong nor valuable and that the parties are not competitors.  However, the Court
has also found that Plaintiff likely will be harmed if the Court denies relief.  The fourth
factor, concerning good-faith ignorance, was neutral.  Thus, when also taking into
consideration the two factors comprising the Jarrow test, the E-Systems factors also
support a laches defense.  Despite the general hesitancy to apply laches at the dismissal
stage, the presumption, the Jarrow test, and the E-Systems factors all suggest that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by laches.  Accordingly, the Court finds that laches applies
and GRANTS Defendant’s MTD as to the Complaint in its entirety.
II. Communications Decency Act (CDA) Immunity 
The CDA provides a limited form of immunity to certain Internet related entities:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”  47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The CDA defines an “information content provider” as “any person
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or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 
Id. § 230(f)(3).  The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server.”  Id. § 230(f)(2).
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the CDA’s immunity for interactive computer
services broadly, holding that the CDA bars state law intellectual property claims. 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Evans v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 13-02477 WHA, 2013 WL 5594717, at *2 (N.D. Cal Oct.
10, 2013)  (citing Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118) (“Section 230 of the CDA bars state law
claims against internet service providers based on content provided by a third party.”); 
Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (“The CDA provides complete immunity to any provider
or user of an interactive computer service from liability premised on information
provided by another content provider.”).  Courts have held a wide array of state law
claims to fall within the CDA’s immunity if they “are predicated on the same conduct
as [the] state law intellectual property claims: the conduct of the content providers.” 
Evans, 2013 WL 5594717, at *2 (unfair competition, trademark law, right of publicity,
emotional distress); Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (negligent and intentional
interference with contractual relations, fraud, unjust enrichment). 
Notably, in Jurin the Eastern District of California held that Defendant is an
interactive computer service entitled to CDA immunity in addressing a similar
challenge to Defendant’s keyword advertising program.  695 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23. 
Plaintiff argues that the dismissal stage is too early to apply CDA immunity, as facts
may yet surface showing that Defendant provides advertisement content.  (Resp. in
Opp’n 17, ECF No. 11.)  Plaintiff fails to note, however, that Jurin, too, was decided
on a motion to dismiss.  See 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, 1122–23.  
The Court finds Jurin to be highly persuasive.  Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid
of allegations that Defendant in any way creates advertising content.  Thus, the Court
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finds that Defendant is instead an interactive computer service entitled to CDA
immunity.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims must fail, and the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s MTD with regard to Plaintiff’s state law trademark infringement, unfair
and deceptive trade practices, and trademark dilution claims.  Further, because these
claims are barred by the CDA, amendment would be futile, and therefore Plaintiff’s
state law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658. 
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in
its entirety.  Dismissal of claims 1, 2, and 5 is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.  Because the
laches determination was exceedingly close, and because the appropriateness of laches
is such a fact-specific inquiry, it is possible that Plaintiff may be able to allege
additional facts sufficient to plead plausible claims to rebut this finding.  Dismissal of
claims 3, 4, and 6, however, is WITH PREJUDICE. 
If Plaintiff wishes, it SHALL FILE an amended complaint within fourteen days
of the date on which this Order is electronically docketed.  Failure to file an amended
complaint by this date may result in dismissal of this case with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED:  December 4, 2013
Honorable Janis L. Sammartino
United States District Judge
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